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Abstract
In this work, we establish near-linear and strong convergence for a natural first-order
iterative algorithm that simulates Von Neumann’s Alternating Projections method in zero-
sum games. First, we provide a precise analysis of Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent
(OGDA) – an optimistic variant of Gradient Descent/Ascent [DISZ17] – for unconstrained
bilinear games, extending and strengthening prior results along several directions. Our
characterization is based on a closed-form solution we derive for the dynamics, while our
results also reveal several surprising properties. Indeed, our main algorithmic contribution
is founded on a geometric feature of OGDA we discovered; namely, the limit points of the
dynamics are the orthogonal projection of the initial state to the space of attractors.
Motivated by this property, we show that the equilibria for a natural class of constrained
bilinear games are the intersection of the unconstrained stationary points with the cor-
responding probability simplexes. Thus, we employ OGDA to implement an Alternating
Projections procedure, converging to an -approximate Nash equilibrium in O˜(log2(1/))
iterations. Although our algorithm closely resembles the no-regret projected OGDA dy-
namics, it surpasses the optimal no-regret convergence rate of Θ(1/) [DDK15], while it also
supplements the recent work in pursuing last-iterate guarantees in saddle-point problems
[DP18a, MLZ+19]. Finally, we illustrate an – in principle – trivial reduction from any game
to the assumed class of instances, without altering the space of equilibria.
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1 Introduction
The classical problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in multi-agent systems has been a topic of
prolific research in several areas, including Mathematics, Economics, Algorithmic Game Theory,
Optimization [Nas50, Sio58, DGP06, NRTV07, Nes05] and more recently Machine Learning in
the context of Generative Adversarial Networks [GPAM+14, ACB17] and multi-agent reinforce-
ment learning [HW98]. The inception of this endeavor can be traced back to Von Neumann’s
celebrated min-max theorem, which asserts that
min
x∈∆n
max
y∈∆m
xTAy = max
y∈∆m
min
x∈∆n
xTAy, (1)
where ∆n and ∆m are probability simplexes and A the matrix of the game. To be more pre-
cise, (1) implies that an equilibrium – a pair of randomized strategies such that neither player
can benefit from a unilateral deviation – always exists; yet, the min-max theorem does not
inform us on whether natural learning algorithms can converge to this equilibrium with a rea-
sonable amount of computational resources. This question has given rise to intense research,
commencing from the analysis of fictitious play by J. Robinson [Rob51] and leading to the
development of the no-regret framework [CBL06, BM05, AHK12]. However, an unsatisfactory
characteristic of these results is that the minimax pair is only obtained in an average sense,
without any last-iterate guarantees. Indeed, a regret-based analysis cannot distinguish between
a self-stabilizing system and one with recurrent cycles. In this context, it has been exten-
sively documented that limit cycles – or more precisely Poincare´ recurrences – are persistent in
broad families of no-regret schemes, such as Mirror Descent and Follow-The-Regularized-Leader
[MPP18, PPP17, PP16, PS14].
Figure 1: The behavior of Projected Gradient Descent (leftmost image) and Entropic - or Exponentiated
- Descent (rightmost image) for the game of matching pennies. Symbol ’x’ represents the unique (uniform)
equilibrium, while the red point corresponds to the initial state of the system. Although both algorithms
suffer no-regret – as instances of Mirror Descent, they exhibit cyclic behavior around the equilibrium.
The crucial issue of last-iterate convergence was addressed by Daskalakis et al. [DISZ17]
in two-player and zero-sum games in the context of training Generative Adversarial Networks.
In particular, they introduced Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent (henceforth abbreviated as
OGDA), a simple variant of Gradient Descent/Ascent (GDA) that incorporates a prediction
term on the next iteration’s gradient, and they proved point-wise convergence in unconstrained
bilinear min-max optimization problems. It is clear that the stabilizing effect of optimism is
of fundamental importance within the scope of Game Theory, which endeavors to study and
indeed, control dynamical systems of autonomous agents. However, despite recent follow-up
works [LS19, MOP20], an exact characterization of OGDA and its properties remains largely
1
unresolved. In this context, the first part of our work provides a precise analysis of OGDA,
resolving several open issues and illuminating surprising attributes of the dynamics.
Naturally, the stability of the learning algorithm has also emerged as a critical consideration
in the more challenging and indeed, relevant case of constrained zero-sum – or simply zero-
sum – games. Specifically, Daskalakis and Panageas [DP18a] analyzed an optimistic variant
of Multiplicative Weight Updates and they showed last-iterate convergence in games with a
unique equilibrium; yet, the rate of convergence was left entirely open. The same issue arises
in the analysis of Optimistic Mirror Descent by Mertikopoulos et al. [MLZ+19]; in the parlance
of the Variational Inequality framework, the main challenge is that the operator – the flow –
in bilinear games is weakly-monotone – just as linear functions are convex in a weak sense –
and standard tools appear to be of no use. The main algorithmic contribution of our paper
is a natural variant of projected OGDA that simulates an Alternating Projections procedure;
as such, it exhibits a surprising near-linear and strong convergence in constrained games. Our
approach is based on a non-trivial geometric property of OGDA: the limit points are – under
certain hypotheses – positively correlated with the Nash equilibria of the constrained game.
Although our algorithm is not admitted in the no-regret framework, it is based entirely on the
no-regret (projected) OGDA dynamics. Importantly, our techniques and the connections we
establish could prove useful in the characterization of the convergence’s rate in other algorithms.
Related Work Our work follows the line of research initiated by [DISZ17]; one of their key
results was proving through an inductive argument that OGDA, a simple variant of GDA,
exhibits point-wise convergence to the space of Nash equilibria for any unconstrained bilinear
game. The convergence rate was later shown to be linear in [LS19]. Moreover, this result
was also proven in [MOP20], where the authors illustrated that OGDA can be examined as an
approximate version of the proximal point method; through this prism, they also provided a
convergence guarantee for convex-concave games. However, both of the aforementioned works
consider only the special case of a square matrix with full-rank.
The underlying technique of optimism employed in OGDA has gradually emerged in the
fields of Online Learning and Convex Optimization [SALS15, SL14, WA18], and has led to
very natural algorithmic paradigms. More precisely, optimism consists of exploiting the pre-
dictability or smoothness of the future cost functions, incorporating additional knowledge in
the optimization step. In fact, in the context of zero-sum games, this technique has guided the
optimal no-regret algorithms, leading to a regret of Θ(1/T ), where T the number of iterations
[DDK15, RS13].
It is well-established that a minimax pair in zero-sum games can be computed in a central-
ized manner via an induced Linear Program (LP). In particular, interior point methods and
variants of Newton’s method are known to exhibit very fast convergence, even super-linear –
e.g. O(log log (1/)); see [PW00, Wri97]. We also refer to [Reb09] for the ellipsoid method,
another celebrated approach for solving LPs. However, these algorithms are not commonly
used in practice for a number of reasons. Indeed, first-order methods have dominated the at-
tention both in the literature and in practical applications, mainly due to their simplicity, their
robustness - e.g. noise tolerance - and the limited computational cost of implementing a single
step, relatively to the aforementioned algorithms [Rud16]. Another reference point for our work
should be Nesterov’s iterative algorithm [Nes05] that strongly converges to an -approximate
equilibrium after O(1/) iterations.
In a closely related work, Mertikopoulos et. al [MLZ+19] established convergence for pro-
jected OGDA and Extra-Gradient dynamics. Our main algorithm is also established as pro-
jected variant of OGDA, but instead of projecting after a single step, the projection is per-
formed after multiple iterations. A no-regret analysis of Optimistic Mirror Descent can be
found in [KHSC18]. For a characterization of the stationary points of GDA and OGDA and
their nexus to Nash equilibria beyond convex-concave settings we refer to [DP18b]. Finally,
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several algorithms have been proposed specifically for solving saddle-point problems; we refer
to [ADLH19, SA19, MJS19] and references thereof.
Our Contributions In the first part of our work (Section 3), we provide a thorough and com-
prehensive analysis of Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent in unconstrained bilinear games.
Specifically, we first derive an exact and concise solution to the dynamics in Subsection 3.1;
through this result, we establish convergence from any initial state (Theorem 3.1). Note that
the guarantee in [DISZ17] was only shown for cherry-picked initial conditions, an unnatural
restriction for a linear dynamical system. We also show that the rate of convergence is linear
(Corollary 5.1); this was proved in follow-up works [LS19, MOP20] for the specific case of a
square non-singular matrix. Our analysis is also tighter with respect to the learning rate, yield-
ing a broader stability region compared to the aforementioned works. In fact, in Proposition 3.2
we derive the exact rate of convergence with respect to the learning rate and the spectrum of
the matrix. One important implication is that within our stable region, increasing the learning
rate will accelerate the convergence of the system, a property which is of clear significance in
practical implementations of the algorithm. Proposition 3.2 also implies a surprising disconti-
nuity on the behavior of the system: an arbitrarily small noise may dramatically alter the rate
of convergence (see Appendix B). Another counter-intuitive consequence of our results is that
OGDA could actually converge with negative learning rate. Finally, we reformulate our solu-
tion to illustrate the inherent oscillatory components in the dynamics, albeit with a vanishing
amplitude (Appendix D). Throughout Section 3, we mainly use techniques and tools from Lin-
ear Algebra and Spectral Analysis – such as the Spectral Decomposition, while we also derive
several non-trivial identities that could of independent interest. We consider our analysis to be
simpler than the existing ones.
In the second part, we turn to constrained games and we commence (in Section 4) by showing
that the Nash equilibria are the intersection of the unconstrained stationary points with the
corresponding probability simplexes, assuming that the value of the (constrained) game is zero
and that there exists an interior equilibrium (see Proposition 4.3). Thus, under these conditions,
the optimal strategies can be expressed as the intersection of two closed and convex sets and
hence, they can be determined through Von Neumann’s Alternating Projections method. In this
context, our algorithm (Algorithm 1) is based on a non-trivial structural property of OGDA:
the limit points are the orthogonal projection of the initial state to the space of attractors (see
Theorem 3.2 for a formal statement). As a result, OGDA is employed in order to implement the
Alternating Projections procedure. We show with simple arguments that our algorithm yields
an -approximate Nash equilibrium with O˜(log2(1/)) iterations (Theorem 5.2). To the best
of our knowledge, the rate of convergence of our algorithm outperforms the known first-order
methods; surprisingly, although our algorithm closely resembles the no-regret projected OGDA
dynamics, it surpasses the optimal no-regret convergence rate of Θ(1/) [DDK15].
Moreover, our algorithm also converges in the last-iterate sense, supplementing the recent
works in this particular direction [MLZ+19, DP18a]; however, unlike the aforementioned results,
our analysis gives a precise and parametric characterization of the convergence’s rate; thus, our
techniques could prove useful in the analysis of other dynamics. We also believe that the variant
of projected Gradient Descent we introduced, namely performing the projection to the feasible
set only after multiple iterations, could be of independent interest in the regime of Optimization.
The main caveat of our approach is that we consider (constrained) games that have an interior
equilibrium and value v = 0; we ameliorate this limitation by showing an – in principle –
trivial reduction from any arbitrary game to the assumed class of instances. We emphasize on
the fact that the equilibria of the game remain – essentially – invariant under our reduction.
Importantly, our approach offers a novel algorithmic viewpoint on a fundamental problem in
Optimization and Game Theory.
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Alternating Projections Our main algorithm (Algorithm 1) is an approximate instance
of Von Neumann’s celebrated method of Alternating Projections. More precisely, if H1 and
H2 are closed subspaces of a Hilbert space H, he showed that alternatively projecting to H1
and H2 will eventually converge in norm to the projection of the initial point to H1 ∩ H2.
This method has been applied in many areas, including Stochastic Processes [AA68], solving
linear equations [Tan71] and Convex Optimization [BB96, Bre67, BV04], while it was also
independently discovered by Wiener [Wie55]. Moreover, a generalization of this algorithm to
multiple closed subspaces was given by Halperin [Hal62], introducing the method of cyclic
alternating projections. The rate of convergence was addressed in [Aro50, BGM10, KW88], and
in particular it was shown that for 2 closed subspaces – and under mild assumptions – the rate of
convergence is linear and parameterized by the Friedrichs angle between the subspaces. Beyond
affine spaces, Von Neumann’s method also converges when the sets are closed and convex 1,
assuming a non-empty intersection. In fact, certain results in this domain are applicable even
when the intersection between the subsets is empty; e.g. see Dijkstra’s projection algorithm.
2 Preliminaries
Nash equilibrium Consider a continuously differentiable function f : X × Y 7→ R that
represents the objective function of the game, with f(x,y) the payoff of player X to player Y
under strategies x ∈ X and y ∈ Y respectively. A pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) ∈ X × Y is a Nash
equilibrium – or a saddle-point of f(x,y) – if ∀(x,y) ∈ X × Y,
f(x∗,y) ≤ f(x∗,y∗) ≤ f(x,y∗). (2)
A pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) will be referred to as an -approximate Nash equilibrium if
it satisfies (2) with up to an  additive error. We may sometimes refer to player X as the
minimizer and player Y as the maximizer. Throughout this paper, we consider exclusively the
case of f(x,y) = xTAy, while in a constrained game – or simply (finite) zero-sum game in the
literature of Game Theory – we additionally require that X = ∆n and Y = ∆m.
Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent Let us focus on the unconstrained case, i.e. X = Rn
and Y = Rm. The most natural optimization algorithm for solving the induced saddle-point
problem is by performing simultaneously Gradient Descent on x and Gradient Ascent on y;
formally, if η > 0 denotes some positive constant – typically referred to as the learning rate,
GDA can be described as follows:
xt = xt−1 − η∇xf(xt−1,yt−1),
yt = yt−1 + η∇yf(xt−1,yt−1).
(3)
However, there are very simple examples where the system of equations (3) diverges; for
instance, when f(x, y) = xy with x, y ∈ R and (x0, y0) 6= (0, 0), GDA is known to diverge
for any learning rate η > 0. This inadequacy has motivated optimistic variants of GDA that
incorporate some prediction on the next iteration’s gradient through the regularization term
(recall that Gradient Descent can be viewed as an instance of Follow-The-Regularized-Leader
(FTRL) with Euclidean regularizer [Sha12]). With OGDA we refer to the optimization variant
that arises when the prediction of the next iteration’s gradient is simply the previously observed
gradient; this yields the following update rules:
xt = xt−1 − 2η∇xf(xt−1,yt−1) + η∇xf(xt−2,yt−2),
yt = yt−1 + 2η∇yf(xt−1,yt−1)− η∇yf(xt−2,yt−2).
(4)
1In this context, the method of alternating projections is sometimes referred to as projection onto convex sets
or POCS
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A probability vector p is referred to as interior if pi > 0, ∀i; subsequently, an equilibrium
point (x,y) ∈ ∆n × ∆m is called interior if both x and y are interior probability vectors.
Let amax the entry of A with maximum absolute value; it follows that the bilinear objective
function f(x,y) = xTAy is |amax|-Lipschitz continuous in ∆n × ∆m. Note that rescaling the
entries of the matrix by a positive constant does not alter the game; for Theorem 5.2 we make
the normative assumption that every entry is multiplied by 1/|amax|, so that the objective
function is 1-Lipschitz. A set is closed if and only if it contains all of its limit points. Moreover,
a subset of a Euclidean space is compact if and only if it is closed and bounded (Heine-Borel
theorem).
Hilbert Spaces Although this paper deals with optimization in finite-dimensional Euclidean
spaces, we wish to present the Alternating Projections method in its general form in arbitrary
Hilbert spaces (see Theorem 5.1). In this context, we review some basic concepts that the
reader may need. A Hilbert space H is an inner product and complete – every Cauchy sequence
converges – metric space. The norm is defined as ||u|| = √〈u, u〉, where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner
product in H. Moreover, the distance between u, v ∈ H is defined in terms of norm by d(u, v) =
||u − v||, while d(u, S) = infv∈S d(u, v) – for some non-empty set S ⊆ H. Also recall from
Hilbert’s projection theorem that if C is a non-empty, closed and convex set in a Hilbert space
H, the projection of any point u ∈ H to C is uniquely defined as PC(u) = arg minv∈C ||u− v||.
Definition 2.1. A sequence {un}∞0 on a Hilbert space H is said to converge linearly 2 to u∗ ∈ H
with rate λ ∈ (0, 1) if
lim
n→∞
||un+1 − u∗||
||un − u∗|| = λ. (5)
Notation We denote with A ∈ Rn×m the matrix of the game and with x ∈ X ,y ∈ Y the
players’ strategies. With ∆k we denote the k-dimensional probability simplex. We use t and
k as discrete time indexes, while the variables i, j, k, t will be implied to be integers, without
explicitly stated as such. We use Ik and 0k×` to refer to the identity matrix of size k × k and
the zero matrix of size k × ` respectively; when k = ` we simply write 0k instead of 0k×k. We
also use 1k×` to denote the k × ` matrix with 1 in every entry, while we sometimes omit the
dimensions when they are clear from the context. The vector norm will refer to the Euclidean
norm || · ||2, while we denote with ||S|| the spectral norm of S, that is, the square root of the
maximum eigenvalue of STS. Finally, N (S) represents the null space of matrix S.
3 Characterizing OGDA
Throughout this section, we analyze Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent for unconstrained and
bilinear games, i.e. f(x,y) = xTAy, X = Rn and Y = Rm.
3.1 Solving the Dynamics
In this subsection, we derive a closed-form and concise solution to the OGDA dynamics. First,
consider some arbitrary initial conditions for the players’ strategies x−1,x0 ∈ Rn and y−1,y0 ∈
Rm. When the objective function is bilinear, the update rules of OGDA (4) can be formulated
for t ≥ 1 as
xt = xt−1 − 2ηAyt−1 + ηAyt−2,
yt = yt−1 + 2ηATxt−1 − ηATxt−2.
(6)
2To avoid confusion, we should mention that linear convergence in iterative methods is usually referred to as
exponential convergence in discretization methods.
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These equations can be expressed more concisely in matrix form:(
xt
yt
)
=
(
In −2ηA
2ηAT Im
)(
xt−1
yt−1
)
+
(
0n ηA
−ηAT 0m
)(
xt−2
yt−2
)
. (7)
In correspondence to the last expression, let us introduce the following matrices:
zt =
(
xt
yt
)
, B =
(
In −2ηA
2ηAT Im
)
, C =
(
0n ηA
−ηAT 0m
)
. (8)
With this notation, Equation (7) can be re-written as
zt = Bzt−1 + Czt−2. (9)
Equation (9) induces a second-order and linear recursion in matrix form; hence, its solution
can be derived through a standard technique. In particular, it is easy to verify that (9) can be
equivalently reformulated as(
zt
zt−1
)
=
(
B C
In+m 0n+m
)(
zt−1
zt−2
)
= ∆t
(
z0
z−1
)
, (10)
where
∆ =
(
B C
In+m 0n+m
)
. (11)
As a result, we have reduced solving the OGDA dynamics to determining matrix ∆t. To this
end, first note that the block sub-matrices of ∆ have the same dimensions (n+m)× (n+m). In
addition, every couple of these sub-matrices satisfies the commutative property; indeed, we can
verify that BC = CB and hence, every possible multiplicative combination will also commute.
Thus, we can invoke for the sub-matrices polynomial identities that apply for scalar numbers.
In this direction, we establish the following claim:
Lemma 3.1. Consider a matrix R ∈ R2×2 defined as
R =
(
b c
1 0
)
. (12)
Then, for any k ≥ 2,
Rk =

b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i
i
)
bk−2ici
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 1
i
)
bk−2i−1ci+1
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 1
i
)
bk−2i−1ci
b k−2
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 2
i
)
bk−2i−2ci+1
 . (13)
We refer to Appendix E.1 for a proof of this lemma; essentially it follows from the Cay-
ley–Hamilton theorem and simple combinatorial arguments. In addition, we can also express
the power of matrix R – as defined in Equation (12) – using the spectral decomposition – or the
more general Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) method, which yields the following identity:
Proposition 3.1. For any b, c ∈ R such that b2 + 4c > 0 and k ≥ 0,
b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i
i
)
bk−2ici =
1√
b2 + 4c

(
b+
√
b2 + 4c
2
)k+1
−
(
b−√b2 + 4c
2
)k+1 . (14)
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This identity can be seen as a non-trivial variant of the celebrated binomial theorem. For a
proof and connections to the Fibonacci series we refer to Appendix E.2. Next, we employ the
previous results to derive analogous expressions for the matrix case.
Corollary 3.1. For any k ≥ 2,
∆k =

b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i
i
)
Bk−2iCi
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 1
i
)
Bk−2i−1Ci+1
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 1
i
)
Bk−2i−1Ci
b k−2
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 2
i
)
Bk−2i−2Ci+1
 . (15)
This claim follows directly from Lemma 3.1 and the fact that the square matrices B and
C commute. As a result, we can apply this corollary to Equation (10) in order to derive the
following expression for the dynamics of OGDA:
(
xt
yt
)
=

b t
2
c∑
i=0
(
t− i
i
)
Bt−2iCi

(
x0
y0
)
+

b t−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
t− i− 1
i
)
Bt−2i−1Ci+1

(
x−1
y−1
)
. (16)
Let us assume that
Qt =
b t
2
c∑
i=0
(
t− i
i
)
Bt−2iCi. (17)
Then, Equation (16) can be written as(
xt
yt
)
= Qt
(
x0
y0
)
+Qt−1C
(
x−1
y−1
)
. (18)
Therefore, the final step is to provide a more compact expression for Qt. Note that the
convergence of the dynamics reduces to the convergence of Qt. To this end, we will establish a
generalized version of Proposition 3.1 that holds for matrices. First, let
T = B2 + 4C =
(
In − 4η2AAT 0n×m
0m×n Im − 4η2ATA
)
. (19)
Let us assume that γ = ||A|| = ||AT ||; recall that ||AAT || = ||ATA|| = γ2. Naturally, we
consider the non-trivial case where γ 6= 0.
Lemma 3.2. For any learning rate η < 1/(2γ), matrix T is positive definite.
We provide a proof for this claim in Appendix E.3. As a result, for any sufficiently small
learning rate, the (positive definite) square root of matrix T – the principal square root T 1/2 –
is well defined, as well as its inverse matrix T−1/2.
Lemma 3.3. Consider a learning rate η < 1/(2γ); then, matrices B and T 1/2 commute.
Corollary 3.2. For any η < 1/(2γ),
Qt = T
−1/2

(
B + T 1/2
2
)t+1
−
(
B − T 1/2
2
)t+1 . (20)
This corollary follows directly from the previous lemmas and Proposition 3.1. Therefore, if
we replace the derived expression of Qt in Equation (18) we obtain a closed-form and succinct
solution for the OGDA dynamics. In the following sections we employ this result to characterize
the behavior of the dynamics.
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3.2 Convergence of the Dynamics
It is clear that analyzing the convergence of OGDA reduces to investigating the asymptotic
behavior of Qt; in particular, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.1. For any learning rate η < 1/(2γ), OGDA converges from any initial state.
Sketch of Proof. We give a high-level sketch of our techniques. For a rigorous proof we refer
to Appendix E.5. First, a sufficient condition for the claim to hold is that the powers of both
matrices (B + T 1/2)/2 and (B − T 1/2)/2 converge, which is tantamount to showing that their
spectrum resides within the unit circle. In this context, although the spectrum of B and T 1/2
can be determined as a simple exercise, the main complication is that the spectrum of the sum
of matrices cannot be – in general – characterized from the individual components. Nonetheless,
we show that B and T 1/2 are simultaneously diagonalizable and that their eigenvalues are in a
particular correspondence.
Remark Throughout our analysis we made the natural assumption that the learning rate
η is positive. However, our proof of convergence in Theorem 3.1 (see Appendix E.5) remains
valid when |η| < 1/(2γ), implying a very counter-intuitive property: OGDA can actually con-
verge with negative learning rate! Of course, this is very surprising since performing Gradient
Descent/Ascent with negative learning rate leads both players to the direction of the (locally)
worst strategy. Perhaps, the optimistic term negates this intuition.
Corollary 3.3. For any learning rate η < 1/(2γ), OGDA exhibits linear convergence.
We can also provide an exact characterization of the convergence’s rate of OGDA with
respect to the learning rate and the spectrum of the matrix of the game A, as stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let λmin be the minimum non-zero eigenvalue of matrix 4η
2AAT ; then,
assuming that η < 1/(2γ), the convergence rate of OGDA is e(λmin), where
e(λ) =
√
1 +
√
1− λ
2
. (21)
For the proof of the claim we refer to Appendix E.6. An important consequence of this
proposition is that while η < 1/(2γ), increasing the learning rate will accelerate the convergence
of the dynamics. Moreover, Proposition 3.2 implies a rather surprising discontinuity on the rate
of convergence (see Appendix B). We also refer to Appendix D for a precise characterization of
the inherent oscillatory component in the dynamics. This subsection is concluded with a simple
example, namely f(x, y) = xy with x, y ∈ R. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the learning rate
to the behavior of the system.
3.3 Limit Points of the Dynamics
Having established the convergence of the dynamics, the next natural question that arises
relates to the characterization of the limit points. We initiate our analysis with the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.3. A pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) ∈ Rn × Rm constitutes a Nash equilibrium for
the unconstrained bilinear game if and only if Ay∗ = 0 and ATx∗ = 0, that is y∗ ∈ N (A) and
x∗ ∈ N (AT ).
As a result, it is easy to show that when the players’ strategies converge, the limit points
will constitute a Nash equilibrium, as stated in the following proposition.
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Figure 2: The trajectories of the players’ strategies throughout the evolution of the game; the blue color
corresponds to a positive learning rate, while the orange to a negative one. We know from Theorem 3.1
that when η < 1/2 the dynamics converge; moreover, it follows from Proposition 3.2 that while the
learning rate gradually increases, without exceeding the threshold of η = 1/2, the system exhibits faster
convergence and limited oscillatory behavior. Remarkably, a negative learning rate simply leads to a
reflection of the trajectories.
Proposition 3.4. If OGDA converges, the limit points are Nash equilibria.
This claim follows very easily from the structure of OGDA and Proposition 3.3; we refer to
Appendix E.8 for the proof. Proposition 3.4 asserts that the limit points x∞ and y∞ reside in
the left and right null space of A respectively – assuming convergence. In fact, we can establish
a much more precise characterization. In particular, let r the rank of matrix A; from the
fundamental theorem of Linear Algebra it follows that dimN (A) = m − r and dimN (AT ) =
n− r. We shall prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let {y1,y2, . . . ,ym−r} an orthonormal basis for N (A) and {x1,x2, . . . ,xn−r}
an orthonormal basis for N (AT ); then, assuming that η < 1/(2γ), y∞ is the orthogonal projec-
tion of y0 to N (A) and x∞ is the orthogonal projection of x0 to N (AT ), that is
lim
t→∞yt =
m−r∑
i=1
〈y0,yi〉yi, (22)
lim
t→∞xt =
n−r∑
i=1
〈x0,xi〉xi. (23)
The proof follows from our solution to the OGDA dynamics and simple calculations (see
Appendix E.9). This theorem provides a very important and natural insight on the limit points
of OGDA: the dynamics converge to the attractor which is closer to the initial configuration
(x0,y0). An important implication of this property is that we can use OGDA in order to
implement the projection to the null space of A – for the y player – and the null space of AT –
for the x player.
4 Characterization of Nash equilibria in Constrained Games
The main purpose of this section is to correlate the equilibria between constrained and un-
constrained games. Specifically, if v represents the value of a constrained game that possesses
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an interior equilibrium, we show that (x,y) ∈ ∆n × ∆m is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
Ay = v1 and ATx = v1; thus, when v = 0 the stationary points will derive from the intersec-
tion of the null space of A and AT with the corresponding probability simplexes, establishing a
clear connection with the saddle-points of the corresponding unconstrained bilinear game (recall
Proposition 3.3). First, let us introduce the following notation:
NE = {(x∗,y∗) ∈ ∆n ×∆m : (x∗,y∗) is an equilibrium of the constrained game}. (24)
Consider two pairs of Nash equilibria; a very natural question is whether a mixture – a
convex combination – of these pairs will also constitute a Nash equilibrium. This question is
answered in the affirmative in the following propositions.
Proposition 4.1. There exist ∆∗n ⊆ ∆n and ∆∗m ⊆ ∆m, with ∆∗n,∆∗m 6= ∅, such that NE =
∆∗n ×∆∗m.
Sketch of Proof. The claim follows from a simple decoupling argument; in particular, it is easy
to see that
(x∗,y∗) ∈ NE ⇐⇒

x∗ ∈ arg min
x∈∆n
max
y∈∆m
xTAy
y∗ ∈ arg max
y∈∆m
min
x∈∆n
xTAy
 ⇐⇒
{
x∗ ∈ ∆∗n
y∗ ∈ ∆∗m
}
, (25)
where ∆∗n and ∆∗m constitute the set of optimal strategies, as defined in (25). Finally, note that
Von Neumann’s min-max theorem implies that ∆∗n and ∆∗m are non-empty.
Proposition 4.2. The sets of optimal strategies ∆∗n and ∆∗m are convex.
Proof. Let x∗1,x∗2 ∈ ∆∗n and some λ ∈ [0, 1]. It suffices to show that λx∗1 + (1− λ)x∗2 ∈ ∆∗n; the
convexity of ∆∗m will then follow from an analogous argument. Indeed, we have that
max
y∈∆m
(λx∗1 + (1− λ)x∗2)TAy ≤ λ max
y∈∆m
(x∗1)
TAy + (1− λ) max
y∈∆m
(x∗2)
TAy
≤ max
y∈∆m
xTAy, ∀x ∈ ∆n,
where the last line follows from x∗1,x∗2 ∈ ∆∗n; thus, λx∗1 + (1− λ)x∗2 ∈ ∆∗n.
While the previous statements hold for any arbitrary game, the following proposition will
require two separate hypotheses; after we establish the proof we will illustrate that these as-
sumptions are – in principle – generic, in the sense that every game can be reduced with simple
operations to the assumed form, without – essentially – altering the space of equilibria.
Proposition 4.3. Consider a constrained zero-sum game with an interior equilibrium and value
v = 0; then, it follows that
NE =
(
∆n ∩N (AT )
)× (∆m ∩N (A)) . (26)
Reduction Finally, we shall address the assumptions made in the last proposition. First,
consider a matrix A′ that derives from A with the addition of a constant c in every entry; then,
for x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆m, it follows that
xTA′y = xT (A+ c1n×m)y = xTAy + c. (27)
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Therefore, the addition of c in every entry of the matrix does not alter the space of Nash
equilibria; it does, however, change the value of the game by an additive constant c. As a result,
if we add in every entry of a matrix the value −v, the game that arises has a value of zero.
As a corollary of Proposition 4.3, (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium pair – in a game where there
exists an interior equilibrium – if and only if Ay = v1 and ATx = v1. Furthermore, consider
a game that does not possess an interior equilibrium. In particular, let us assume that every
x∗ ∈ ∆∗n resides in the boundary of ∆n. Then, it follows that there exists some action for player
x with zero probability for every x∗ ∈ ∆∗n. Indeed, if we posit otherwise Proposition 4.2 implies
the existence of an interior probability vector x∗ ∈ ∆∗n, contradicting our initial hypothesis.
Thus, we can iteratively remove every row from the matrix that corresponds to such actions,
until no such row exists. It is easy to see that this operation does not have an impact on the
Nash equilibria of the game, modulo some dimensions in which the player always assigns zero
probability mass. Finally, we can apply – if needed – a similar process for the column player and
obtain a game with an interior equilibrium. In other words, games without interior equilibria
are reducible, in the sense that the ’unsound’ actions from either the row or the column player
can be removed without altering the game under optimal play.
Remark It is important to point out that this reduction argument is merely a thought exper-
iment, illustrating that the games we consider capture – at least in some sense – the complexity
of the entire class; yet, it does not provide an appropriate reduction since unknown components
– such as the value of the game – are used. We leave as an open question whether it is possible
to incorporate this reduction in our iterative algorithm.
5 Alternating Projections
Based on the properties we have established in the previous sections, we provide an algorithm
that (strongly) converges to the space of Nash equilibria in constrained games. Throughout
this section, we will require that the value of the game is zero and that there exists an interior
equilibrium (see Appendix C on why these assumptions are necessary); under these hypotheses,
we have a strong characterization of the optimal strategies (Proposition 4.3): ∆∗n = ∆n∩N (AT )
and ∆∗m = ∆m ∩N (A). As a result, we can employ an Alternating Projections scheme.
Complexity of Projection It is important to point out that the complexity of implementing
a projection to a non-empty, convex and closed set C depends primarily on the structure of
C. Indeed, identifying the projection to an arbitrary set constitutes a non-trivial optimization
problem of its own. For this reason, we need OGDA to implement the projection to the null
space of A and AT . On the other hand, we make the standard assumption that the projection
to the probability simplex is computed in a single iteration.
In this context, our main algorithm constitutes a projected variant of OGDA; specifically,
instead of projecting after a single step, we simulate multiple steps Ts of the OGDA algorithm,
before finally performing the projection. This process will be repeated for Tp cycles. We will
assume for simplicity that OGDA is initialized with x−1 = 0 and y−1 = 0, without having an
impact on its limit points (Theorem 3.2). Recall from Theorem 3.2 that OGDA converges to the
projection of the initial conditions x0 and y0 to the left and right null space of A respectively.
Thus, our algorithm essentially performs – for sufficiently large Ts – alternate projections in
N (AT ) and ∆n in the domain of the x player, and in N (A) and ∆m in the domain of the y
player. In this sense, it can be viewed as an approximate instance of Alternating Projections.
We state the following theorem in order to illustrate the robustness of this method to arbitrary
Hilbert spaces.
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Algorithm 1: Alternating Projections
Result: Approximate Nash equilibrium
Input: matrix of the game A, (xp0,y
p
0) ∈ ∆n ×∆m, learning rate η
for k := 1, 2, . . . , Tp do
x0 := x
p
k−1;
y0 := y
p
k−1;
for t := 1, 2, . . . , Ts do
xt := xt−1 − 2ηAyt−1 + ηAyt−2;
yt := yt−1 + 2ηATxt−1 − ηATxt−2;
end
xpk := P∆n(xTs);
ypk := P∆m(yTs);
end
return (xpTp ,y
p
Tp
);
Theorem 5.1. Let M and N denote closed and convex subsets of a Hilbert space H with non-
empty intersection and I ∈ H. If one of the sets is compact 3, the method of Alternating
Projections converges in norm to a point in the intersection of the sets; that is, ∃L ∈ M ∩N ,
such that
lim
n→∞ || (PMPN )
n (I)− L|| = 0. (28)
This theorem directly implies the convergence of Algorithm 1. Indeed, first note that a
probability simplex is compact and convex. Moreover, the null space of any matrix is a vector
(or linear) space of finite dimension and thus, it is trivially a convex and closed set. Finally,
under our assumptions, ∆n∩N (AT ) 6= ∅ and ∆m∩N (A) 6= ∅; as a result, the following corollary
follows from Theorem 3.2, Proposition 4.3 and Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.1. Consider a constrained zero-sum game with an interior equilibrium and value
v = 0; if η < 1/(2γ), then for Ts, Tp →∞, Algorithm 1 converges in norm to a Nash equilibrium.
The final step is to characterize the rate of convergence of our algorithm. In the following
proof we use techniques from [BB93].
Theorem 5.2. Consider a constrained zero-sum game with an interior equilibrium and value
v = 0, and let λ ∈ (0, 1) the rate of convergence of OGDA; if η < 1/(2γ), then there exists a
parameter α ∈ (0, 1) such that Algorithm 1 yields an -approximate Nash equilibrium, for any
 > 0, with Tp ∈ O
(
log(1/)
log(1/α)
)
cycles and Ts ∈
(
log(1/((1−α)))
log(1/λ)
)
steps.
Proof. First, we analyze the dynamics in the domain of player y. Let ypi ≡ I ∈ ∆m the strategy
of player y in some cycle i of the algorithm, P = PN (A)(I) and I ′ = P∆mPN (A)(I) = P∆m(P ).
It is easy to see that ∃κ ≥ 1, such that for any I ∈ ∆m, d(I,∆∗m) ≤ κd(I,N (A)). Indeed, if we
assume otherwise it follows that there exists an accumulation point I of N (A) with I /∈ N (A),
a contradiction given that N (A) is a closed set. Fix any arbitrary L ∈ ∆∗m; since projection is
firmly non-expansive it follows that
d2(I,N (A)) = ||I − P ||2 = ||(I − L)− (PN (A)(I)− PN (A)(L))||2
≤ ||I − L||2 − ||PN (A)(I)− PN (A)(L)||2
≤ ||I − L||2 − ||P∆mPN (A)(I)− P∆mPN (A)(L)||2
= ||I − L||2 − ||I ′ − L||2.
3We refer to [CTP90, BB93] for more refined conditions
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In particular, if we let L = P∆∗m(I), it follows that
1
κ2
d2(I,∆∗m) ≤ ||I − P∆∗m(I)||2 − ||I ′ − P∆∗m(I)||2
≤ d2(I,∆∗m)− d2(I ′,∆∗m).
As a result, we have established the following bound:
d(I ′,∆∗m) ≤
√
1− 1
κ2
d(I,∆∗m). (29)
Let α =
√
1− 1/κ2 ∈ [0, 1). The case of α = 0 is trivial and hence, we will assume that
α > 0. Since OGDA exhibits linear convergence with rate λ, it follows that we can reach
within δ distance from P with Ts ∈ O(log δ/ log λ) number of steps. Given that projection
is a contraction, we obtain that ypi+1 is within δ distance from I
′; thus, applying the triangle
inequality yields that for every cycle i
d(ypi+1,∆
∗
m) ≤ αd(ypi ,∆∗m) + δ. (30)
Therefore, if we perform Tp cycles of the algorithm, we have that
d(ypTp ,∆
∗
m) ≤ αTpd(yp0,∆∗m) +
δ
1− α. (31)
As a result, if Tp ∈ O
(
log(1/)
log(1/α)
)
and Ts ∈
(
log(1/((1−α)δ))
log(1/λ)
)
, we obtain a probability vector
ypTp that resides within  + δ distance from the set of optimal strategies ∆
∗
m. By symmetry,
∃α′ ∈ (0, 1) such that after an analogous number of cycles and steps the probability vector of
player xp will also reside within  + δ distance from her set of optimal strategies ∆∗n. Finally,
the theorem follows for a := max{α, α′} by the Lipschitz continuity of the objective function of
the game.
As a consequence, we can reach an -approximate Nash equilibrium with O˜(log2(1/)) it-
erations of Algorithm 1. We remark that the crucial parameter that determines the rate of
convergence in the Alternating Projections procedure is the angle between the subspaces, in
the form of parameter α - as introduced in the previous proof. Note that this parameter can
be arbitrarily close to 1, for sufficiently high dimensions and with equilibria sufficiently close to
the boundary of the simplex. We refer to Appendix A for an additional discussion and simple
examples of our algorithm.
6 Concluding Remarks
The main contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we strongly supplement our knowledge
on the behavior of Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent in bilinear games, providing a tighter
and more precise characterization. Our analysis raises several questions that need to be ad-
dressed in future research and indeed, we believe that a deeper understanding of the optimistic
term and its stabilizing role in the dynamics remains – to a large extent – unresolved. Moreover,
we proposed a variant of projected OGDA that simulates an Alternating Projections procedure
and we showed a surprising near-linear convergence guarantee. Our main algorithmic result
applies for games with interior equilibria and value v = 0. In this context, an interesting av-
enue for future research would be to investigate whether our algorithm can be generalized for
any arbitrary game; in other words, can we somehow incorporate the simple operations of our
reduction in the iterative algorithm?
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A Examples on Algorithm 1
In this section, we provide simple examples in order to illustrate the behavior of our main algo-
rithm. In particular, we first consider the matching pennies games, defined with the following
matrix:
A =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
. (32)
It is easy to see that this game has a unique equilibrium point, in which both players are
selecting their actions uniformly at random. Note that in this case, the null space of A (and
similarly for AT ) is a one-dimensional vector space – i.e. a line – which is perpendicular to
the probability simplex ∆m (Figure 4). Thus, the dynamics converge in a single cycle of our
algorithm, as implied by Theorem 3.2. This property holds more broadly in every game with a
unique and uniform equilibrium. Indeed, the line of OGDA attractors in each domain will be
perpendicular to the corresponding probability simplex. On the other hand, let us consider a
rotated version of matching pennies:
Arot =
(
3 −9
−1 3
)
. (33)
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In this case, it is easy to verify that x∗ =
(
1
4 ,
3
4
)
and y∗ =
(
3
4 ,
1
4
)
, and the optimal strategies
for each player are unique. Unlike the previous example, the limit points of OGDA are not
valid probability vectors and multiple cycles are required to approximate the Nash equilibrium.
Note that the speed of convergence can be parameterized by α, as introduced in the proof of
Theorem 5.2. Specifically, in matching pennies – and every game with a unique and uniform
equilibrium – α = 0 (⇐⇒ κ = 1; see proof of Theorem 5.2) and indeed, a single cycle suffices to
reach the space of equilibria. On the other hand, the rotated version induces α > 0, decelerating
the convergence. In other words, the value of α determines how fast the Alternating Projections
procedure will converge. Intuitively, one should relate α to the angle between ∆m and N (A) –
in the domain of player y. Naturally, this parameter is – in general – different for the domain
of each player and thus, the rate of convergence for the players can be asymmetrical.
Figure 3: The trajectories of Algorithm 1 for matching pennies (leftmost image) and the rotated version
of matching pennies (rightmost image). The blue color corresponds to the first coordinate of P∆n(xt),
while the orange to the first coordinate of P∆m(yt). For every instance, the dynamics converge to the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
B Discontinuity on the Rate of Convergence of OGDA
In this section, we elaborate on a surprising consequence of Proposition 3.2 that relates to
a discontinuity on the behavior of OGDA. More precisely, consider a (unconstrained) game
described with the following matrix:
A =
(
1 −1
−1 1
)
. (34)
Matrix AAT = A2 has eigenvalues at λ1 = 0 and λ2 = 4 and hence, as implied by Propo-
sition 3.2 the rate of convergence is e(4η2λ2). However, consider a perturbed matrix A that
derives from A by the addition of a small  > 0 in each entry. In this case, the rate of conver-
gence is determined by λ′1 = 42 and subsequently, it can be arbitrarily close to 1, leading to a
dramatic discontinuity in the behavior of OGDA, as illustrated in the Figure 5. Perhaps even
more remarkably, the smaller the magnitude of the noise , the larger the discrepancy in the
rate of convergence.
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Figure 4: The corresponding geometry from Figure 3 in the domain of player y. In the matching
pennies game the null space N (A) is perpendicular to the probability simplex ∆2 (leftmost image),
while rotating the matrix results in a spin of N (A) (rightmost image). Recall from Proposition 4.3 that
– for the games we consider – the subspace N (A) (and N (AT )) always intersects the corresponding
probability simplex.
Figure 5: The dynamics of OGDA (in the first coordinate) for the same number of iterations when
η = 0.005 and  = 0.01. Despite the presence of very limited noise, the systems exhibit a strikingly
different behavior.
C Necessity of the Assumptions
Our Alternating Projections algorithm (Algorithm 1) requires two separate hypotheses, namely
that the value of the game is zero and that there exists an interior equilibrium. It is the purpose
of this section to show that both of these assumptions are also necessary. In particular, first
consider the following matrix:
A1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (35)
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It is clear that the induced game has a unique and interior equilibrium. However, since A1
is square and non-singular, it follows that N (A) ∩∆m = ∅ and N (AT ) ∩∆n = ∅ and thus, the
Alternating Projections algorithm will not converge. Similarly, consider the following trivial
game:
A2 =
(
0 0
1 1
)
. (36)
In this case, the minimizer or row player will completely disregard the second row and
thus, the value of the game will be zero. However, it again follows that N (A) ∩ ∆m = ∅ and
N (AT ) ∩ ∆n = ∅. Note that according to our reduction, we simply subtract −1/2 from each
entry of A1 and we remove the second row from A2; after these simple operations we are able
to apply our algorithm.
D Oscillations in OGDA
Despite the convergence guarantee of the OGDA dynamics, the trajectories of the players’
strategies feature oscillations, albeit with an ever decreasing amplitude; however, our derived
solution in Equation (20) does not provide an immediate justification for this phenomenon. For
this reason, we shall reformulate the solution of the dynamics in a way that will explain the
oscillations that occur. In particular, note that the term Qt (17) can be seen as a weighted
convolution (see Appendix F for an asymptotic analysis of the weights) between matrices B and
C. In this section, we characterize the individual terms in the summation and then, Qt will be
understood as the superposition of these atomic expressions. First, we can prove by induction
the following lemma:
Lemma D.1. Let us introduce the following notation:
Mk(S) =
b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k
2i
)
(−4η2SST )i, (37)
Nk(S) =
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k
2i+ 1
)
(−4η2SST )i. (38)
Then, for every k ≥ 1,
Bk =
 Mk(A) −2ηANk(AT )
2ηATNk(A) Mk(A
T )
 . (39)
We refer to Appendix E.11 for the proof. Importantly, Bk is inherently characterized by
oscillatory behavior, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition D.1. For any η < 1/(2γ), it follows that
Mk(A) = (In + 4η
2AAT )k/2 cos(kΩ), (40)
2η(AAT )1/2Nk(A) = (In + 4η
2AAT )k/2 sin(kΩ), (41)
where Ω = tan−1
(
2η(AAT )1/2
)
.
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Note that trigonometric functions can be defined for matrices through their Taylor expan-
sion. It is clear that the powers of matrix C will be in a pseudo-diagonal block form and hence,
each matrix multiplication Bt−2iCi will induce a multi-dimensional, oscillating waveform with
a particular frequency pattern in each dimension. In other words, Qt can be expressed as a
weighted combination of sine and cosine terms with a specific frequency spectrum. Thus, the
oscillatory behavior of the trajectories is inherent in the dynamics, while at the same time The-
orem 3.1 reassures us that the cumulative interference of these terms will gradually vanish – for
sufficiently small learning rate – as time progresses.
E Omitted Proofs
E.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. First, let χR(λ) = det(λI2−R) the characteristic polynomial of matrix R; it follows that
χR(λ) = λ
2 − bλ− c. If we apply the Cayley-Hamilton theorem we obtain that
R2 = bR+ cI2. (42)
Inductively, it follows that
Rk = pk(b, c)R+ qk(b, c)I2 k ≥ 0, (43)
for some polynomials pk(b, c) and qk(b, c), with p0 = 0 and q0 = 1. As a result, if we multiply
(43) by matrix R and invoke Equation (42), it follows that
Rk+1 = pk(b, c)R
2 + qk(b, c)R
= pk(b, c)(bR+ cI2) + qk(b, c)R
= (bpk(b, c) + qk(b, c))R+ cpk(b, c)I2. (44)
Moreover, it follows that the last equation is equivalent to the following system of polynomial
equivalencies: {
pk+1(b, c) = bpk(b, c) + qk(b, c)
qk+1(b, c) = cpk(b, c)
}
. (45)
Finally, we can easily decouple pk from system (45), obtaining that
pk+1(b, c) = bpk(b, c) + cpk−1(b, c). (46)
Note that p0 = 0 and p1 = 1. Therefore, we can solve Equation (45) with simple com-
binatorial arguments; to be more precise, imagine that we commence from a height of k + 1.
The polynomial recursion informs us on the feasible moves we can perform while decreasing the
height and traversing towards the base – height of 1. It is clear that each path corresponds
to a single monomial, while its coefficient is determined by the number of paths that lead to
the same monomial. For instance, the term bk can only appear in the path that consists of
unit steps. In general, the solution will comprise of monomials of the form bk−2ici, where its
coefficient coincides with the number of paths that lead to the same term, i.e. the number of
ways we can select i junctions – where we apply a step of size 2 – from a total of k − i moves.
Thus, we have proven the following:
pk+1(b, c) =
b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i
i
)
bk−2ici k ≥ 0, (47)
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qk+1(b, c) =
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 1
i
)
bk−2i−1ci+1 k ≥ 1. (48)
Note that if b = c = 1, then the polynomial recursion (46) induces the Fibonacci sequence
and as a result, if Fn denotes the n
th term of the Fibonacci sequence, we have proven the
following well-known identity:
Fn+1 =
bn
2
c∑
i=0
(
n− i
i
)
. (49)
An additional observation is that if we substitute the expressions of pk(b, c) and qk(b, c) in
the identity pk+1(b, c) = bpk(b, c) + qk(b, c, we obtain the following non-trivial formula:
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 1
i
)
bk−2ici +
b k−2
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i− 2
i
)
bk−2i−1ci+1 =
b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k − i
i
)
bk−2ici. (50)
Finally, the lemma follows if we substitute the expressions of pk(b, c) (47) and qk(b, c) (48)
to Equation (43).
E.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. We consider again the matrix R ∈ R2×2 defined as
R =
(
b c
1 0
)
.
Given that b2 + 4c > 0, matrix R has two real and distinct eigenvalues:
λ1,2 =
b±√b2 + 4c
2
. (51)
Moreover, if we denote with u1 and u2 the eigenvectors that correspond to the eigenvalues
λ1 and λ2 respectively, it follows that
U =
(
u1 u2
)
=
(
b+
√
b2 + 4c b−√b2 + 4c
2 2
)
, (52)
U−1 =
1
4
√
b2 + 4c
(
2 −b+√b2 + 4c
−2 b+√b2 + 4c
)
. (53)
If Λ denotes the diagonal matrix with entries the eigenvalues of matrix R, the spectral
decomposition yields that
R = UΛU−1. (54)
As a result, we have that
Rk =
1
4
√
b2 + 4c
(
b+
√
b2 + 4c b−√b2 + 4c
2 2
)(
λk1 0
0 λk2
)(
2 −b+√b2 + 4c
−2 b+√b2 + 4c
)
. (55)
Thus, if we perform the matrix multiplications and equate the derived expression with the
result in Lemma 3.1, the claim follows.
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We should also point out an interesting connection between the previous formula and the
Fibonacci series; in particular, let φ = (1 +
√
5)/2 denote the golden ratio. If we apply the
identity in Proposition 3.1 for b = c = 1, we derive the well-known closed-form solution of the
Fibonacci series.
Fn+1 =
bn
2
c∑
i=0
(
n− i
i
)
=
1√
5
(
(φ)n+1 − (−φ−1)n+1) . (56)
E.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. The claim is tantamount to showing that the matrices In−4η2AAT and Im−4η2ATA are
both positive definite. We shall prove the claim for the former; the latter admits an analogous
proof. Consider a non-zero vector x ∈ Rn; then, the quadratic form of the matrix can be written
as
xT (In − 4η2AAT )x = ||x||2 − 4η2||ATx||2. (57)
Moreover, since η < 1/(2γ), it follows that 4η2||ATx||2 ≤ 4η2||AT ||2||x||2 < ||x||2; hence,
the quadratic form is always positive and the lemma follows.
E.4 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. First, we will show that the ρ(T ) ≤ 1. Indeed, note that the eigenvalues of T are the
union of the eigenvalues of matrices In − 4η2AAT and Im − 4η2ATA. Let χ(λ) denote the
characteristic equation of matrix 4η2AAT ; the roots of χ(λ) are real numbers in [0, 1). In
addition,
det(λIn − (In − 4η2AAT )) = χ(1− λ). (58)
Thus, the last equation implies that the eigenvalues of the matrix In − 4η2AAT reside in
(0, 1]. A similar argument holds for the matrix Im − 4η2ATA and thus, ρ(T ) ≤ 1. As a result,
given that the eigenvalues of T are real numbers, the following power series converges:
T 1/2 = In+m −
∞∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣(1/2i
)∣∣∣∣ (In+m − T )i. (59)
Moreover, note that T and B commute since B and C commute. Thus, applying the previous
formula completes the proof.
E.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
The proof of the theorem requires analyzing the spectrum of the matrices that appear in the
expression of Qt; first, recall that a real and square matrix S is said to be normal if SS
T = STS.
It is easy to see that T 1/2 is symmetric and hence it will also satisfy the aforementioned property.
Moreover, it follows that B is also a normal matrix:
BBT =
(
In + 4η
2AAT 0n×m
0m×n Im + 4η2ATA
)
= BTB. (60)
In addition, we know from Lemma 3.3 that T 1/2 and B are commutative, that is T 1/2B =
BT 1/2. As a result, we know from a fundamental theorem of Linear Algebra that B and T 1/2 are
simultaneously unitarily diagonalizable, that is there exists a unitary matrix U , such that the
matrices U∗T 1/2U and U∗BU are diagonal – where U∗ denotes the conjugate transpose of U .
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Let u a column of matrix U and u1 and u2 the sub-vectors of dimension n and m respectively.
Then, it follows that u constitutes an eigenvector of T 1/2 and B. Moreover, it is easy to see
that u will also be an eigenvector for T ; if we let µ and µ′ the corresponding eigenvalues for T
and B respectively, we have that
Tu = µu ⇐⇒
{
4η2AATu1 = (1− µ)u1
4η2ATAu2 = (1− µ)u2
}
, (61)
Bu = µ′u ⇐⇒
{
2ηAu2 = (1− µ′)u1
2ηATu1 = (µ
′ − 1)u2
}
. (62)
Therefore, if we combine these equations we can deduce that{
(1− µ)u1 = −(1− µ′)2u1
(1− µ)u2 = −(1− µ′)2u2
}
. (63)
Thus, since u 6= 0 it follows that (1−µ) = −(1−µ′)2. Moreover, let us denote with Λ and Λ
the set of eigenvalues of 4η2AAT and 4η2ATA respectively; since, AAT and ATA are symmetric
positive semi-definite matrices and η < 1/(2γ), it follows that λ ∈ [0, 1), ∀λ ∈ Λ ∪ Λ. It is easy
to verify that the set of eigenvalues of T will be {1− λ : λ ∈ Λ ∪Λ}. As a result, an eigenvalue
λ ∈ Λ∪Λ will induce an eigenvalue µ′ in matrix B, such that −(1−µ′)2 = λ ⇐⇒ µ′ = 1±√λj.
Note that the double multiplicity is justified by the fact that the subset of non-zero eigenvalues
of Λ coincides with the subset of non-zero eigenvalues of Λ. As a result, if λ1, λ2, . . . , λr the
non-zero eigenvalues of Λ – or equivalently Λ – we have proven that
U∗T 1/2U = diagonal(
n+m eigenvalues︷ ︸︸ ︷√
1− λ1,
√
1− λ1, . . . ,
√
1− λr,
√
1− λr, 1, . . . , 1), (64)
U∗BU = diagonal(
n+m eigenvalues︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 +
√
λ1j, 1−
√
λ1j, . . . , 1 +
√
λrj, 1−
√
λrj, 1, . . . , 1). (65)
Finally, let us introduce the following matrices:
E =
B + T 1/2
2
, (66)
V =
B − T 1/2
2
. (67)
It is sufficient to show that the power of each of these matrices converges while t→∞. In
particular, recall that Sk – with S ∈Mn – converges while k →∞ if and only if ρ(S) ≤ 1 and
the only eigenvalues with unit norm are real and positive numbers. Through this prism, notice
that Matrix E has eigenvalues of the following form:
λe =
√
1− λ+ 1±√λj
2
, (68)
where λ ∈ [0, 1). Therefore, we can verify that |λe| ≤ 1 and |λe| = 1 ⇐⇒ λe = 1. Similarly,
we can show that |λv| < 1. As a result, it follows that when t → ∞, V t converges to the zero
matrix, while Et also converges – not necessarily to the zero matrix; thus, it follows that the
dynamics of OGDA converge, completing the proof.
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E.6 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof. Let us assume that Λ denotes the set of eigenvalues of 4η2AAT . In Appendix E.5, we
showed that the spectrum of matrices E (66) and V (67) can be described as follows:
λe =
√
1− λ+ 1±√λj
2
, (68)
λv =
−√1− λ+ 1±√λj
2
, (69)
for λ ∈ [0, 1). Let e(λ) = |λe| and v(λ) = |λv|; these functions capture the spectrum transforma-
tion from matrix 4η2AAT to matrices E and V (see Figure 6). The first important observation
is that for every λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1), e(λ1) > v(λ2); in words, V t converges faster than Et in the
direction of every eigenvector. This implies that the convergence rate of Qt – and subsequently
the OGDA dynamics – is determined by the rate of convergence of Et. Moreover, e(λ) is strictly
decreasing in λ, while also note that the eigenvalues of 4η2AAT are directly proportional to η2.
Therefore, the optimal convergence rate is obtained for the maximal value of η, that is for
η ↑ 1/(2γ). Finally, let λmin = min{λ ∈ Λ : λ 6= 0}. Given that e(·) is a strictly decreasing
function, the convergence rate of OGDA is e(λmin) ∈ (0, 1). Note that the zero eigenvalues
of AAT and ATA induce stationarity in the corresponding eigenvectors. We also remark that
a lower bound for the convergence rate is
√
2/2, obtained when every non-zero eigenvalue of
4η2AAT approaches to 1. On the other hand, eigenvalues of 4η2AAT with very small value will
lead to a rate of convergence close to sub-linear (see Appendix B).
Figure 6: The spectrum transformation from matrix 4η2AAT to matrices E and V . The blue line
corresponds to function e(λ) and the red line to v(λ). It is clear that e(λ) > v(λ), while they intersect
in the limit λ→ 1−.
E.7 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. First, consider a pair of strategies (x,y) such that Ay = 0 and ATx = 0. We will show
that (x,y) constitutes a Nash equilibrium pair. Indeed, if we fix the action of player X , the
objective function xTAy is nullified – since x ∈ N (AT ) – independently from the action of
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player Y; hence, deviating from y cannot increase her obtained utility from the game. A similar
argument holds if we fix the action of player Y.
Conversely, assume that player Y responds with a strategy y such that Ay 6= 0, that is
there exists an index i such that eTi Ay = v 6= 0 – with ei ∈ Rn the vector from the canonical
orthonormal basis with 1 in its ith coordinate. Then, the minimizer player X can respond
with a strategy of x = −vei that will lead to a negative value for the objective function of
−v2 < 0. However, the maximizer player Y could deviate, responding with a vector of y = 0
that increases the objective function to zero and thus improves her utility. Therefore, a vector
y /∈ N (A) cannot correspond to a Nash equilibrium, and a similar argument applies for player
X . In other words, if (x,y) constitutes a Nash equilibrium, then x ∈ N (AT ) and y ∈ N (A).
E.8 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. Let us denote with x∞ = limt→+∞ xt, and y∞ = limt→+∞ yt,. It follows from Equa-
tion (6) that
lim
t→+∞(xt+1 − xt) = 0 = −2ηAy∞ + ηAy∞ =⇒ Ay∞ = 0, (70)
lim
t→+∞(yt+1 − yt) = 0 = −2ηA
Tx∞ + ηATx∞ =⇒ ATx∞ = 0. (71)
As a result, the claim follows from Proposition 3.3.
E.9 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. Let us denote with Q∞ = limt→∞Qt and introduce again the matrices E = (B+T 1/2)/2
and V = (B − T 1/2)/2. Moreover, let Λ and Λ the set of eigenvalues of 4η2AAT and 4η2ATA
respectively; given that these matrices are positive semi-definite and γ < 1/(2γ), it follows
that λ ∈ [0, 1), ∀λ ∈ Λ ∪ Λ. As we showed in Appendix E.5, B and T 1/2 are simultaneously
unitarily diagonalizable, i.e. there exists a unitary matrix U such that U∗T 1/2U and U∗BU are
diagonal, with U∗ denoting the conjugate transpose of U . This property allowed us to identify
the spectrum of matrices E and V from the individual spectrum of B and T 1/2. In particular,
it follows that λe = (1 +
√
1− λ ± √λj)/2 and λv = (1 −
√
1− λ ± √λj)/2, with λe and λv
representing the eigenvalues of E and V , λ ∈ [0, 1) and j the imaginary unit. As a result, we
obtain that |λv| < 1 and thus V t converges to the zero matrix, as t→∞. Similarly, in matrix
limt→∞Et every eigenvalue vanishes, except the stationary eigenvalues λe = 1; that is |λe| ≤ 1
and |λe| = 1 ⇐⇒ λe = 1.
Moreover, the eigenvectors of matrices B and T 1/2 that correspond to these stationary
eigenvalues serve as a basis for N (A) and N (AT ); more precisely, if u is a column of matrix
U , it follows that the solution space of Bu = u coincides with the solution space of T 1/2u = u
(⇐⇒ Tu = u). This equivalence derives from the equality of N (A) with N (ATA) and N (AT )
with N (AAT ) (see (61) and (62) for µ = µ′ = 1). Thus, since U is a unitary matrix – the
columns form a orthonormal basis, it follows that the set of columns of U that correspond to
eigenvalues of λ = 1 can be written as{(
0n
y
)
: y ∈ By
}⋃{( x
0m
)
: x ∈ Bx
}
, (72)
where By = {y1, . . . ,ym−r} some orthonormal basis for N (A) and Bx = {x1, . . . ,xn−r} some
orthonormal basis for N (AT ). Next, note that the action of every other eigenvector asymptoti-
cally vanishes since the corresponding eigenvalue vanishes in norm. As a result, we obtain from
simple algebraic calculations that
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lim
t→∞E
t =
n−r∑
i=1
(
xi(xi)T 0n×m
0m×n 0m×m
)
+
m−r∑
i=1
(
0n×n 0n×m
0m×n yi(yi)T
)
. (73)
In addition, the eigenvectors of T 1/2 and T−1/2 are – in correspondence – equal and thus, it
follows that (In−4η2AAT )−1/2x = x,∀x ∈ Bx and similarly (Im−4η2ATA)−1/2y = y, ∀y ∈ By.
Therefore, it follows that the action of T−1/2 is idempotent with respect to limt→∞Et :
Q∞ = T−1/2 lim
t→∞E
t =
n−r∑
i=1
(
xi(xi)T 0n×m
0m×n 0m×m
)
+
m−r∑
i=1
(
0n×n 0n×m
0m×n yi(yi)T
)
. (74)
Let us return to (16); given that Ay = 0, ∀y ∈ By and ATx = 0, ∀x ∈ Bx, it is easy to see
that Q∞C is the zero matrix. As a corollary, the initial conditions (x−1,y−1) do not influence
the limit points of the dynamics. Finally, the theorem follows directly from (74) and (16).
E.10 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. Let (x∗i ,y
∗
i ) be an interior equilibrium of the game. Consider x ∈ ∆n and y ∈ ∆m such
that ATx = 0 and Ay = 0; it is clear that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium pair since any unilateral
deviation from either player will not alter the expected utility from the game. For the other
inclusion, we shall first show that Ay∗i = 0 and A
Tx∗i = 0. Indeed, if there was a single entry
in vector Ay∗i strictly smaller than zero, then given that the strategy of the min player x
∗
i is a
best response to y∗i , the value of the game would be also strictly less than zero, contradicting
the initial assumption. Moreover, if there was a single entry in Ay∗i strictly greater than zero,
then the best response to y∗i would not be an interior probability vector x
∗
i . An analogous
argument shows that ATx∗i = 0. Finally, consider any (x
∗,y∗) ∈ NE; then, it follows from
Proposition 4.1 that (x∗,y∗i ) ∈ NE. Given that the value of the game is zero, every entry in
ATx∗ is non-positive, and at the same time non-negative since the interior probability vector y∗i
is a best response to x∗. Thus, x∗ ∈ N (AT ) and a similar argument proves that y∗ ∈ N (A).
E.11 Proof of Lemma D.1
Proof. The lemma will be proved through induction. First, the claim holds trivially for k = 1.
Next, we make the inductive hypothesis that
Bk =
 Mk(A) −2ηANk(AT )
2ηATNk(A) Mk(A
T )
 , (75)
for any k ∈ N. It suffices to show that the claim follows for k + 1. In particular, from the
inductive hypothesis it follows that
Bk+1 =
 Mk(A)− 4η2ANk(AT )AT −2ηMk(A)A− 2ηANk(AT )
2ηATNk(A) + 2ηMk(A
T )AT −4η2ATNk(A)A+Mk(AT )
 . (76)
We will show that Mk(A) − 4η2ANk(AT )AT = Mk+1(A); the remainder of the claim will
then admit an analogous proof. For the analysis we will use Pascal’s formula:(
n
k
)
=
(
n− 1
k
)
+
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
. (77)
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First, we consider the case where k − 1 ≡ 0 mod 2; then, it follows that
Mk(A)− 4η2ANk(AT )AT =
b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k
2i
)
(−4η2AAT )i +
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k
2i+ 1
)
(−4η2AAT )i+1 (78)
=
k−1
2∑
i=0
(
k
2i
)
(−4η2AAT )i +
k+1
2∑
i=1
(
k
2i− 1
)
(−4η2AAT )i (79)
= In +
k−1
2∑
i=1
(
k + 1
2i
)
(−4η2AAT )i + (−4η2AAT ) k+12 (80)
= Mk+1(A), (81)
where we have applied Pascal’s formula in the third line. Similarly, if k−1 ≡ 1 mod 2 it follows
that
Mk(A)− 4η2ANk(AT )AT =
b k
2
c∑
i=0
(
k
2i
)
(−4η2AAT )i +
b k−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
k
2i+ 1
)
(−4η2AAT )i+1 (82)
=
k
2∑
i=0
(
k
2i
)
(−4η2AAT )i +
k
2∑
i=1
(
k
2i− 1
)
(−4η2AAT )i (83)
= In +
k
2∑
i=1
(
k + 1
2i
)
(−4η2AAT )i (84)
= Mk+1(A). (85)
E.12 Proof of Proposition D.1
Proof. First, recall that from the binomial theorem we have that for any z ∈ C
(1 + z)n =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
zi. (86)
If we apply this formula for z = xejpi/2 = xj with x ∈ R and j the imaginary unit, it follows
that
<{(1 + xj)n} =
bn
2
c∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
n
2i
)
x2i. (87)
Moreover, if we express the complex number in trigonometric form we have that
<{(1 + xj)n} = <
{(√
1 + x2ej tan
−1(x)
)n}
= (1 + x2)n/2 cos(n tan−1(x)). (88)
As a result, we have proven that for every x ∈ R
bn
2
c∑
i=0
(
n
2i
)
(−x2)i = (1 + x2)n/2 cos(n tan−1(x)). (89)
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Similarly, we can show that
x
bn−1
2
c∑
i=0
(
n
2i+ 1
)
(−x2)i = (1 + x2)n/2 sin(n tan−1(x)). (90)
We remark that if we replace x = 1, we obtain certain well known identities. We also
stress that any trigonometric function can be defined for matrices through its Taylor expansion.
Recall that the Taylor expansion of cos(x) and sin(x) converges for any x ∈ R, while the Taylor
expansion of tan−1(x) converges for any |x| ≤ 1; thus, tan−1(2η(AAT )1/2) will also converge for
η < 1/(2γ) and the lemma follows directly from (89) and (90).
F Asymptotic Analysis of Binomial Coefficient
In our analysis we encountered the following binomial coefficient:(
n− i
i
)
. (91)
In this section, we provide an asymptotic characterization of the behavior of this particular
term. To be precise, it is well known that(
n
i
)
∈ O
(
2n√
n
)
, (92)
for every i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ n and the bound is asymptotically tight for i = bn/2c. We derive
an analogous expression for the term (91); in particular, if φ = (1 +
√
5)/2 denotes the golden
ratio, we will prove that (
n− i
i
)
∈ O
(
φn√
n
)
. (93)
We commence the analysis with a simple lemma that will be directly applied to prove the
aforementioned bound.
Lemma F.1. Consider a function f : (0, 12) 7→ R+ defined as
f(a) =
(1− a)1−a
aa(1− 2a)1−2a . (94)
Then, f obtains its maximum for a∗ = (5−√5)/10, with f(a∗) = φ.
Proof. Consider the function g(a) = log f(a), which can be expressed as follows:
g(a) = (1− a) log(1− a)− a log a− (1− 2a) log(1− 2a). (95)
It is easy to check that g′′(a) < 0 and hence g is concave; moreover, it is trivial to show that
there exists a point a∗ that maximizes g and thus, it follows that
log(1− 2a∗) = log(1− a
∗) + log a∗
2
⇐⇒ 1− 2a∗ =
√
(1− a∗)a∗. (96)
Therefore, since a∗ ∈ (0, 12), it follows that a∗ = (5 −
√
5)/10. It is clear that a∗ also
maximizes function f and thus, the claim follows if we evaluate f at a∗.
Let us return to the term (91); for an upper bound, it is sufficient to restrict our attention to
the case of i = Θ(n), that is i = α · n for some α ∈ (0, 1). We will use the following well-known
formula:
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Lemma F.2. Stirling’s Approximation Formula:
n! ∈ Θ
(√
2pin
(n
e
)n)
. (97)
Note that the asymptotic notation is with respect to variable n. Therefore, if we apply this
formula it follows that
(
n− i
i
)
=
((1− α)n)!
(αn)!((1− 2α)n)!
∈ Θ
(
1√
n
(
(1− α)1−α
αα(1− 2α)1−2α
)n)
. (98)
Thus, if we apply Lemma F.1 we obtain a bound of O(φn/√n) which is asymptotically tight
for i = bn(5−√5)/10c.
Figure 7: The behavior of the term (91) while i progresses from 0 to bn/2c. The red lines are positioned
in i = bn(5−√5)/10c and i = dn(5−√5)/10e, and one of them corresponds to the maximum obtained
value of the binomial sequence.
30
